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Circulation of minor 
Comparative Vote Shifts in the United States and Great Britain
Five patterns stand out in these estimates of inter-election change. Firstly, the average total vote shift in the American series is quite high, reflecting an electoral volatility rooted in the current decomposition of American parties. The average vote shift in the American elections is almost three times the magnitude of British shifts. Butler and Stokes emphasize that 'Electoral change is due not to a limited group of "floating" voters but to a very broad segment of British electors.'3 This is even more true of American voters. 
Straight Conversion Between the Parties
Secondly, in the American elections since I960, the dominant element in electoral shifts is straight conversion between the major parties. On the average, straight conversion accounts for roughly three-quarters of the net vote shift since I960. One reason can be inferred from the formulas in the Appendix. Any vote captured from the major-party opposition is worth two votes. It is simultaneously a vote gained by one major party and a vote lost to the other. In contrast, a party that successfully mobilizes a new voter, a non-voter, or a previous supporter of a minor party enjoys a net gain of only one. For this reason conversion is more important than recruitment to the short-term fortunes of political parties.
Caution is appropriate when comparing straight party conversion inABritish and American elections. Candidate choice in a presidential election is predictably less influenced by long-term party attachments than in a parliamentary election. Even so, the magnitude of conversion in present-day American elections is consistently large, while only the Labour victory of I966 and the Conservative victories of 1970 and I979 display even small net vote shifts between the major parties.
Caution is appropriate when comparing straight party conversion inABritish and American elections. Candidate choice in a presidential election is predictably less influenced by long-term party attachments than in a parliamentary election. Even so, the magnitude of conversion in present-day American elections is consistently large, while only the Labour victory of I966 and the Conservative victories of 1970 and I979 display even small net vote shifts between the major parties. The net effect of differential turnout is significant in the British election series. Table  I shows that differential turnout is second only to straight conversion in its average contribution to British election shifts. The net effect of differential turnout was Table I indicates, differential turnout favours the winning party in every British election in the series.
These occasional voters are also important to electoral change in the United States. Differential turnout contributed from 1-7 to 3-3 percentage points to the winning candidate's lead in each of the elections from 1964 to 1976. As Campbell's hypothesis predicts, these occasional voters favoured the election victor in every case except I980. In both I968 and 1976, the shift of the peripheral electorate exceeded the respective victory margins of Nixon and Carter. In short, in spite of the fact that the great bulk of non-voters in the United States are people who are unregistered and who never vote,10 the pool of occasional voters is sufficiently large to have a systematic and important effect on electoral change. Landslides excepted, the partisan consequences of mortality are minor in the United States because the mean age differences between Republicans and Democrats have not been very large since the I950s13 and perhaps even since the completion of the New Deal realignment after I936.14 Yet, even though the average mortality rates of Republicans and Democrats are fairly equal, these averages do mask interesting and potentially important differences between sub-groups. For example, in 1970 the remaining life expectancy of a person reaching the age of twenty was 57 years for white women, 52 years for non-white women, 50 years for white men, and 45 years for non-white men. Since non-whites cast between I6 and 22 per cent of all Democratic votes between I968 and 1976,15 the higher mortality rates of non-whites would appear to put the Democrats at a systematic disadvantage. The reality is somewhat different. Landslides excepted, the partisan consequences of mortality are minor in the United States because the mean age differences between Republicans and Democrats have not been very large since the I950s13 and perhaps even since the completion of the New Deal realignment after I936.14 Yet, even though the average mortality rates of Republicans and Democrats are fairly equal, these averages do mask interesting and potentially important differences between sub-groups. For example, in 1970 the remaining life expectancy of a person reaching the age of twenty was 57 years for white women, 52 years for non-white women, 50 years for white men, and 45 years for non-white men. Since non-whites cast between I6 and 22 per cent of all Democratic votes between I968 and 1976,15 the higher mortality rates of non-whites would appear to put the Democrats at a systematic disadvantage. The reality is somewhat different. As Table 7 reveals, the average percentage of deaths in the American voter coalitions varies substantially across groups, from 7-5 per cent for non-white male Democrats to only 2-9 per cent for white female Democrats. While a higher total percentage of Republicans than Democratic voters died after every election in the series, the net differences were fairly small because the large sub-group differences almost cancelled each other out, leaving the parties roughly at parity. One can see, however, a possible consequence of the gender differences that emerged between the party coalitions in 1980. To the degree that Democrats attract a disproportionate percentage of women, the much lower mortality rates of women could be a significant long-term advantage for the Democratic party.
Replacement of the Electorate

CONCLUSION
The most dramatic difference between inter-election shifts in the United States and Great Britain is the greater frequency of straight conversion between the major parties in American elections. The average shift attributable to straight conversion in the United States exceeds the British average by a factor of four. The consequence is that inter-election shifts are much larger in the United States than in Great Britain.
One explanation for the difference is undoubtedly constitutional. In American elections the attributes of individual presidential candidates are an important determinant of a vote. In a parliamentary election, where votes are cast directly only for candidates for parliament, the importance of partisanship is undoubtedly greater. Magnifying this constitutional difference, however, is the continuing atrophy of American electoral parties, so strongly evident in the volatility of these elections.
Another important pattern is the rapidity of the replacement of the electorate in both countries. The anomaly is perhaps that this physical replacement does not have an even greater impact on the partisan balance over several elections than it does. In Britain, new voters did support Labour on balance, but not by a great margin. In the United States new voters shifted with the rest of the population to the winning candidate, and they voted at low rates. While mortality rates differ significantly by race and sex within each party, death-rates are non-partisan because sub-group differences cancel each other out.
Except for straight conversion, the magnitudes of the other sources of inter-election shifts were relatively similar in the United States and Great Britain. The consistency of such patterns in both nations over a period of two decades underscores the richness of an analysis of inter-election shifts. As Table 7 reveals, the average percentage of deaths in the American voter coalitions varies substantially across groups, from 7-5 per cent for non-white male Democrats to only 2-9 per cent for white female Democrats. While a higher total percentage of Republicans than Democratic voters died after every election in the series, the net differences were fairly small because the large sub-group differences almost cancelled each other out, leaving the parties roughly at parity. One can see, however, a possible consequence of the gender differences that emerged between the party coalitions in 1980. To the degree that Democrats attract a disproportionate percentage of women, the much lower mortality rates of women could be a significant long-term advantage for the Democratic party.
Except for straight conversion, the magnitudes of the other sources of inter-election shifts were relatively similar in the United States and Great Britain. The consistency of such patterns in both nations over a period of two decades underscores the richness of an analysis of inter-election shifts. In contrast to the case of candidate choice, recall of turnout invariably produces inflated estimates for both the current election and the previous one. Fortunately, in I964, I976 and I980, the CPS field staff validated respondents' vote and registration reports by visits to local election officials. The 1976 study validated I972 reports as well. These validation checks serve admirably to control response error in reports of current turnout. Only the I968 study cannot be so corrected.
The inflation of turnout for a prior presidential election is similarly a tractable problem. Using the 1972-76 CPS panel as an experiment (turnout reports were validated for both elections) the error in 1972 turnout self-reports can be reduced to under 10 per cent simply by assuming that a respondent not validly registered for I976 was also unregistered and thus a non-voter in 1972. These results are sufficiently satisfactory to enable us to treat a cross-section survey with a voter validation component as though it were a wave of a panel survey. (A 10 per cent error in unvalidated turnout reports for current elections is typical for CPS surveys.) All tables except Table 3 are thus corrected. Only when validated information on current registration and voting was missing were self-reports of current and past turnout accepted as valid. In contrast to the case of candidate choice, recall of turnout invariably produces inflated estimates for both the current election and the previous one. Fortunately, in I964, I976 and I980, the CPS field staff validated respondents' vote and registration reports by visits to local election officials. The 1976 study validated I972 reports as well. These validation checks serve admirably to control response error in reports of current turnout. Only the I968 study cannot be so corrected.
The Computation of Electoral Shift
The inflation of turnout for a prior presidential election is similarly a tractable problem. Using the 1972-76 CPS panel as an experiment (turnout reports were validated for both elections) the error in 1972 turnout self-reports can be reduced to under 10 per cent simply by assuming that a respondent not validly registered for I976 was also unregistered and thus a non-voter in 1972. These results are sufficiently satisfactory to enable us to treat a cross-section survey with a voter validation component as though it were a wave of a panel survey. (A 10 per cent error in unvalidated turnout reports for current elections is typical for CPS surveys.) All tables except Table 3 are thus corrected. Only when validated information on current registration and voting was missing were self-reports of current and past turnout accepted as valid. 
